Detalhes da Proposta
Treasury Budget for Ecosystem Stablecoin Liquidity
elder.millenial
Resumo
Liquidity is essential for any thriving blockchain ecosystem. Cardano has a developing ecosystem with many of the necessary primitives already built out: decentralized exchanges (DEXs), native stablecoins, money market protocols including borrow/lend and collateralized debt positions (CDP), and liquid staking tokens. Each of these primitives on their own help push an ecosystem from the development stage into the flourishing and mature stage. Stablecoins play a unique role in any cryptocurrency system as a means of onboarding new users with a fiat pegged token and volatility protection. However, without deep liquidity the true value of the Cardano decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem cannot be realized, and a critical mass of liquidity is necessary to encourage broader adoption. This proposal outlines the use of treasury funds to boost stablecoin liquidity, creating a stronger foundation for DeFi. Increasing stablecoin reserves not only expands liquidity but also attracts new users and reinforces confidence in the chain — offering a solid hedge against volatility and supports Cardano native stablecoins.
Motivação
High level overview
- Amount - The Cardano treasury should dedicate 3.33% of treasury funds (50 million ada) to purchasing fiat backed stablecoins, spread out over 12 monthly purchases.
- Management - A 7 entity committee will manage the treasury reserve using a multi-signature wallet (4 of 7 signature validation) to hold and deploy funds to protocols. The committee will be composed of 4 community members and one representative from each of the 3 founding entitees (Cardano Foundation, IOG, and Emurgo). The committee will be responsible for working with protocols to convert ADA to fiat backed stablecoins and deploying liquidity. A specific focus of the committee will be analyzing approaches of deploying ADA to stablecoins in a way that minimizes ADA price impact.
- Ownership - The stablecoin reserver will remain in the ownership of the Cardano Treasury, but will be managed by a committee.
- Revenue - ADA in the reserve waiting for deployment will be staked to earn interest while deployed over the 12 month period. 15% of fees generated from protocols will be withdrawn from the respective protocols and sent back to the treasury, while the remaining 85% of fees will remain in the protocol to accumulate.
- Deployment - DeFi protocols with at least 250,000 ADA worth of a stablecoin may apply to be recipients of minted stablecoin. A maximum of 2 or 3 protocols may be used per DeFi category to help minimize fragmentation. Applicants should make a strong case for the use of their protocol, including a a description of historical success, security, dedicated support for handling issues, and features of the protocol that will maximize the value to the Cardano treasury if liquidity is deployed to the protocol. New protocols will not be excluded for having limited history, but must make a strong case in other areas of the application.
- Strategy - The committee will deploy funds on a monthly basis in a way that minimizes ADA price impact and fees. A specific focus should be on deployment of liquidity that can be "passively" managed, meaning frequent adjustements are not needed.
- Transparency - The committee is responsible for either creating a monthly report or building a dashboard to describe the ADA held in reserve, the funds deployed to protocols, and all fees and other costs associated with managing the treasury. The committee may partner with an existing protocol to develop a dashboard to provide live updates of the stablecoin reserve for the Cardano community.
- Costs - Each member of the committee will be compensated $2,000/month in the fiat backed stablecoin of their choice ($14,000 total for all committee members). The stablecoin reserve fund will cover the costs of minting fiat backed stables, deployment of liquidity to protocols, and rebalancing if needed. The committe will also use some funds to perform KYB/KYC of 3rd parties as needed. Total costs per month should be capped at $50,000/month.
- Organization - The stablecoin treasury reserve will be formed as a non-profit in the USA for legal and tax purposes (i.e. 501c3). This will allow contributions to the stablecoin reserve to be tax deductible.
Motivation
Introduction
There is a strong need for better liquidity, especially stablecoin liquidity, in the Cardano ecosystem. Deep stablecoin liquidity helps to serve as an on/off board mechanism for new users as well as a safe haven from market volatility. The Cardano community as a whole benefits from deep stablecoin liquidity, and thus it makes sense to bootstrap this liquidity with funds from the Cardano treasury. In addition to providing mechanisms to onboard new users, deeper liquidity in decentralized exchanges will help stablecoins keep their peg since the stablecoin peg is a function of exchange fees and slippage, where slippage is inversely proportional to liquidity. As liquidity is bootstrapped, a positive feedback loop will be created bringing more professional market makers on chain. We see this consistently in traditional finance and in other blockchain ecosystems. Market Makers are more willing to quote tighter spreads and provide more liquidity into an asset once there is sufficient liquidity in that asset. Liquidity begets liquidity. This will also spur more DeFi innovation, bring more developers and retail participation into the cardano ecosystem, and benefit everyone involved in Cardano.
Another reason to use treasury funds for stablecoin liquidity is to support the significant efforts of those protocols that have developed a native stablecoin on Cardano blockchain. Cardano has had difficulty attracting established stablecoins, leading to efforts to establish stablecoins natively on Cardano. Both Cardano and these protocols benefit by supporting home grown stablecoins, and the treasury should help to support these projects but allocating funds to minting stablecoins.
Stablecoin Reserve
Stablecoins suffer from the "stablecoin trilemma":
- Stability – maintaining a reliable and resilient peg.
- Decentralization – avoiding reliance on centralized entities.
- Capital Efficiency – minimizing overcollateralization or complex mechanisms to back the stablecoin’s value.
Fiat backed stablecoins tend to be capital efficient (1 USD invested in Treasury Bills, money market funds, banks backs 1 stablecoin) and stable. However, these tend to be more centralized than CDP backed stablecoins and algorithmic stablecoins. Given the desire to deepen on chain liquidity and create a thriving ecosystem, fiat backed stablecoins make the most sense (especially given their dominance in other thriving blockchain ecosystems).
Stablecoin Reserve Committee
The stablecoin reserve committee will be compsed of 1 representative each from the three founding Cardano entitites (Cardano Foundation, Emurgo, and IOG) as well as 4 Cardano community members. The committee should have expertise in traditional finance expertise, Cardano development expertise, stablecoin expertise, DeFi expertise and most importantly risk and technical expertise. The committee will be responsible for vetting 3rd parties, evaluating protocol applications, deploying liquidity on a monthly basis. Each member of the committee will be compensated $2000/month in the fiat backed stablecoin of their choice.
For disbursement of treasury funds, a multisignature wallet comprised of an unused address from each of the committee members will be created. The multisignature policy will be a 4 of 7 policy, meaning 4 of the 7 committee members must sign a transaction. This means that a majority of committee members must agree to a transaction and sign it, not allowing any single person to have control over the funds.
The committee must be selected and the multisignature wallet created before disbursement of funds from the treasury, so before the on chain vote a committee will be formed. Each member of the committee must publicly identify themselves to help establish transparency for committee members.
Term Limits
Community members have a maximum term limit of 2 years, after which they can re-apply for a second 2 year term.
Founding entities as a part of the initial composition of the committee may always have a representative on the committee unless impeached. If elected back after impeachment, founding entities will have the same term limits as community members.
Retirement and Impeachment
In the event that a committee member retires or their signing keys are exposed, the remaining members of the committee must create a new multisignature address with the same policy (4 of 7) that removes the retired address. This process also gives the committee the capacity to impeach inactive members of the committee.
New Committee Member Selection
When there is a vacancy on the committee, existing committee members must receive applications for interested candidates and collect community feedback on new applicants. The committee will select a new committee member in alignment with community feedback. At a minimum, 4 community members (unaffiliated with founding entities) must be on the 7 person committee.
Deployment Details
Building out a stablecoin reserve is no easy task. The Cardano Treasury only has ADA currently as a reserve asset. ADA needs to be sold for USD, and then the stablecoins must be minted. The treasury will need 1 or more third party providers to facilitate this transition.
We propose dedicating 3.33% of treasury funds (50 million ADA) to develop a stablecoin reserve for the Cardano treasury. Treasury funds will be deposited into a 7-entity multi-signature wallet which will control disbursement of funds to 3rds parties and protocols. Stablecoins will be allocated to DeFi protocols to earn yield. Each month 15% of yield will also be streamed back into this smart contract, with the remainder being reinvested into participating DeFi protocols.
Fiat backed stablecoins may need to be paired with other assets to deploy to other protocols. For example, to supply liquidity to a DEX, the funds will need to be paired with other tokens such as ADA. To that end, fiat backed stables may only be paired with other stablecoins (fiat backed, algorithmic, or synthetic) or ADA.
Stable Reserve Composition
Before discussing stablecoin reserve composition, it is important to differentiate different types of stablecoins on Cardano
- Fiat back, Cardano native stablecoins - Fiat backed Cardano native stablecoins are Cardano native stablecoins directly backed by treasury bills, money markets, etc.
- Non-fiat backed, Cardano native stablecoins - Cardano native stablecoins that are designed be pegged to USD but are not directly backed by fiat (i.e. CDP, algorithmic, etc)
- Bridged stablecoins - Stablecoins that represent a bridged asset.
With these definitions in mind, the composition limits of the stablecoin reserve will be:
- ADA must make up 30% or less of deployed liquidity
- Non-fiat backed Cardano native stablecoins must make up 10% or less of deployed liquidity
- Remainder of holdings must be in fiat backed Cardano native stablecoins
Example: Each month ~4.2 million ADA will be deployed. If some of this liquidity will be deployed to a DEX for an ADA/Stablecoin pool, then at most ~1.3 million ADA (30% of 4.2 million) can be paired with a fiat backed stablecoin for the month. If paired with another stablecoin such as iUSD or DJED, then at most 420,000 ADA (10% of 4.2 million) worth of iUSD or DJED may be paired with a fiat backed stablecoin for the month.
DeFi Protocol Applications
Protocols must apply to the committee to receive liquidity distributions. The committee will ensure a maximum of 2-3 protocols per protocol types will receive liquidity distributions to help prevent significant fragmentation. Protocol types may include decentralized exchange (DEX) and lending protocols, but the committee will be responsible for creating categories.
Protocol applications must make a strong case for why their protocol should be chosen to receive distribution. A demonstrated history of success will help establish a strong application, but newer protocols should also be considered provided they can demonstrate a strong community and efforts to perform due diligence for the safety and security of their protocol. Strong applications will highlight features of the protocol that will maximimize revenue for supplied liquidity, allowing the best returns back to the Cardano treasury.
For protocols applying to pair their stablecoin (algorithmic or synthetic) with a fiat backed stablecoin, the protocol must detail the relevant mechanisms for maintaining peg, potential risks, and potential risk mitigations (if any).
Justificativa
Third Party Providers
There are two necessary third party providers needed to execute the development of the Cardano stablecoin reserve. They may all be 1 entity or multiple entities. The committee is responsible for performing proper due diligence for all counterparties.
The committee will both accept applications from for 3rd party providers and/or pursue 3rd party providers for each role. Each third party must clearly define any fees (or none) they might charge for their services. These can be flat fees or percentage of assets managed fees. The Stablecoin Market Maker may not charge a fee at all if it is the protocol that does the USD custody and minting of stablecoins. Many times, these protocols earn fees by investing the USD in yield bearing assets (like money market funds, treasury bills, etc.). The ADA Market Marker should earn a flat fee as well, paid monthly from the execution of ADA to USD.
ADA Market Maker
A third party market maker will need to be hired to facilitate the swapping of ADA for USD. This market maker will have guidelines, similar to an investment management agreement/guidelines, which dictate the allowable terms of swapping from ADA to USD. This could be on centralized exchanges, decentralized exchanges, or OTC deals. The ADA Market Maker is responsible for executing the purchase of USD at the best possible prices, with a concern for how the approach will impact the ADA price. This means the market maker will request for quote (RFQ) multiple counterparties (could be individuals, hedge funds, private equity funds, liquid token funds, etc.) with the terms of the deal. Then they will pick the best quotes (lowest discount from spot / highest ADA price in USD) conditional to the terms specified by the Cardano treasury. OTC deals tend to occur at a discount from spot. The Cardano Treasury should consider terms for these deals such as: what discount from spot is allowable, is there a lock associated with the deal (vesting, cliff etc.), can 1 counterparty take 100% of the deal or multiple counterparties, etc. A legal agreement must be put in place to hold the ADA Market Maker accountable and liable for proper custody and best execution practices.
A potential concern for large scale selling of ADA for fiat is ADA price impact, and we present a brief analysis under the ADA price impact section.
Stablecoin Market Maker
A third party market maker will facilitate the swap/minting of USD for the stablecoin (assuming all fiat backed stablecoins at first). Likely this will be facilitated by the protocol itself (i.e. Mehen for USDM and/or Anzens for USDA). This step requires the ADA Market Maker to coordinate with the Stablecoin Market Maker to transfer USD for minting, with appropriate reporting back to the committee transaction details. The stablecoin protocol will then have custody of the USD and mint the stablecoin on chain, depositing it into the committee multisignature account. Research on the backing of each stablecoin is necessary. Ideally the fiat back stablecoins are backed by US Dollars held in backs, treasury bills, or low risk money market funds that only invest in government issued short term paper like treasury bills.
Consideration of ADA Price Impact
A potential concern with this proposal is the conversion of ADA to USD having a major price impact, which is a valid concern. One duty of the ADA Market Maker is to ensure that ADA price is not significantly impacted by conversion to USD. While OTC deals can and should play a part in this, it is helpful to look at the ADA budget allocated to the stablecoin reserve with respect to CEX volume. This proposal requests 3.33% of the 1.5 billion ADA treasury (50 million ADA), dispersed evenly on a monthly basis for 12 months. This means that 4.17 million ADA will be converted per month. Looking at CEX volume, for the last 3 months Coinbase has had an average daily volume of 60 million ADA, with 1.25 million ADA representing ~6.94% of the daily volume. Spreading out sales of ADA combined with use of other CEXs (such as Binance, which has even higher daily volumes) would further reduce price impact. Thus, even not accounting for OTC deals, the amounts of ADA being converted to USD make up a small fraction of daily CEX volume and thus should not have a major impact on ADA price.
Strategy
The primary goal of this proposal is to increase the on-chain liquidity of stablecoins in the Cardano ecosystem. So the first and primary goal should be to create stablecoin liquidity pools on multiple DEXs, which may involve use of a portion of the funds to supply tokens that are not fiat backed stablecoins. There are three critically important types of liquidity provisions.
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A stablecoin to stablecoin pool – ideally using the stablecoin invariant (like Curve’s). These invariants allow for imbalanced pools but keep the price between 2 or more assets relatively steady even with imbalanced pools.
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ADA to stablecoin pool – given the current developments in the Cardano ecosystem, this will likely need to be a 50/50 Constant Product AMM pool.
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Stablecoin lending protocols - Easy and low cost access to stablecoins are a critical component to a vibrant DeFi ecosystem. Supplying more stablecoin assets to these protocols lowers the lending rates, and decreases the barrier to accessing stablecoins.
Up to 3 protocols can be seeded for each of the above pool types. It will be the responsibility of the committee to research and understand the risks and benefits of each protocol’s implementations of these different types of pools. However, it makes sense to specificy that at least 2 protocols should be used to limit closure risk.
Note that use of AMMs inherently require a second token. Refer back to the Stablecoin Reserve Composition
section for details on the maximum allowances for non-fiat backed tokens and types that are permitted.
Oversight
The committee that operates outside of the third parties will be responsible for selecting 3rd parties, reviewing protocol applications for liquidity provision, managing liquidity, and delivering reports to the community. The oversight committee will have the following responsibilities:
- 3rd Party Selection: The committee will be responsible for the underwriting of all three third party managers. The committee is responsible for the initial search or application review, due diligence review, and recommendation. The committee is also responsible for the continual underwriting of third party managers. The role is similar to a manager research role in traditional finance. There should be a cadence to the reviews, quarterly or semiannually. The committee will ensure that the third party managers are operating within their guidelines and pursuing best practices in operations/custody and best execution.
- Protocol Selection: The committee is responsible for reviewing applications for liquidity disbursement. They should select at least 2 but no more than 3 DeFi protocols for DeFi type. Considerations for protocol selection should include security, history of success, revenue generation, and commitment to prompt support if there is a need for the committee to resolve any issues.
- Liquidity Management: Most protocols collect fees passively, so active management should not be required. However, liquidity will need to be disbursed to protocols, and 15% of fees should be removed from protocols and sent back to the Cardano treasury. Actions should be minimized to reduce number of fees generated, and it is recommended to only perform these actions once per month.
- Quarterly Report: Once per quarter the committee should generate a report to deliver to the Cardano community to provide an update on the status of the treasury. The report should include active protocols who have received liquidity, amount of ADA currently held by the committee address, amount disbursed to each protocol, fees generated, and amount of fees returned to the Cardano treasury. To assist in this process, the committee may desire to build a dashboard to keep the community up to date on the current status of the treasury.
Stablecoin Selection
The ultimate selection of the stablecoins in the reserve is a key consideration. As stated above, there is a balance between stability, capital efficiency, and resilience/decentralization that needs to occur. The primary recommendation is to focus on fiat backed stablecoins initially, willingly allowing for some centralization in order to promote the nest peg protection and capital efficiency.
Ideally the committee is responsible for the initial selection and continued re-underwriting of stablecoins to choose from.
Preference should be given to native Cardano stablecoins in order to avoid unnecessary bridge risk.
Understanding the arbitrage mechanism to protect a stablecoins peg is key. If the arbitrage mechanism for fiat backed stablecoins requires native minting/burning, it's highly possible that there is a time delay in arbitraging a stablecoins on chain price back to the peg. This time delay may cause on-chain depegs for a period of time as on-chain users have differing liquidity preferences. These liquidity preferences could show that on-chain users are willing to buy a stablecoin slightly above peg in order to move out of risky token exposures/repay debt/leverage, or sell stablecoins below peg in order to access debt/leverage/ risky token exposure. If the arbitrage mechanism requires a time delay, we could see price depegs from parity and that may affect high Amplification factor stableswap pools.
Risks
- Stablecoin peg risk
- DeFi protocol smart contract risk
- Custodial risks from protocols and the DeFi Custodian
- Execution risks from the ADA Market Maker
- Custodial risks of the stablecoin protocols reserve assets (USDC depeg event as an example)
- Impermanent loss/LVR on stableswaps and ADA/stablecoin pools
- Solvency/bad debt of other DeFi protocols like money markets
Historical View:
Avalanche's Rush Program (2021)
Strategy:
The Avalanche Foundation launched "Avalanche Rush," a $180 million liquidity mining incentive program aimed at attracting DeFi applications and assets to the Avalanche ecosystem.
Key Actions:
- Partnerships - Collaborated with leading DeFi protocols like Aave and Curve to enhance lending services and stablecoin liquidity on Avalanche.
- Incentives - Encouraged users to provide liquidity and engage in borrowing activities, leading to a rapid increase in Total Value Locked (TVL).
Outcome:
- TVL Growth - The program significantly boosted Avalanche's TVL, reflecting increased user engagement and capital inflow.
- Stablecoin Adoption - Established stablecoins such as USDC, USDT, and DAI as prominent assets within the Avalanche network.
- DEX Liquidity - Enhanced liquidity on decentralized exchanges like Trader Joe, resulting in improved trade execution and reduced slippage.
Optimism's Liquidity Mining & Grants (2022)
Strategy:
Optimism, a Layer 2 scaling solution for Ethereum, implemented a liquidity mining program using OP tokens to incentivize DeFi activity on its platform.
Key Actions:
- Incentivization - Allocated OP tokens to liquidity providers on platforms like Uniswap to encourage liquidity provision.
- Governance-Funded Programs - Supported liquidity mining initiatives through governance proposals, aiming for sustainable growth.
Outcome:
- Sustained TVL Growth - The incentives led to increased Total Value Locked on Optimism, attracting more users and capital.
- Treasury Management - Enabled governance to reinvest yields into treasury reserves, promoting long-term sustainability.
Registre seu Voto
Comentários (29)
I'd rather see that same requested amount used to bring USDC natively on chain to Cardano
While I support the goal of increasing stablecoin liquidity, I have several concerns with the current structure of this proposal:
Opaque Committee Selection – There’s no transparent, community-driven process for selecting the 4 community members. Once appointed, they select their own replacements, creating a self-perpetuating structure with limited accountability.
Conflicts of Interest – Some protocols involved in shaping or promoting the proposal may later be selected to receive liquidity, raising concerns about fairness. Additionally, the founding entities represented on the committee have had prior affiliations or support roles with various DeFi protocols in the ecosystem. Without clear safeguards or independent evaluation, the process may lack neutrality.
Barrier to Participation – The 250K ADA stablecoin threshold implies a 500K+ TVL requirement for a single pair, which may unintentionally exclude smaller or newer protocols. A more inclusive model would better support ecosystem diversity and innovation.
Suggestions:
Distribute liquidity more equitably or rotate across all vetted DEXes.
Let the community participate in defining what "vetted" means and determine a mechanism for fairly allocating liquidity across DEXes.
Ensure committee members have relevant DeFi or financial experience and no direct affiliations — such as employment, advisory roles, or financial interest — with eligible protocols. Prior close collaboration should also be disclosed to avoid perceived conflicts of interest.
Consider safeguards to reduce the risk of bias or corruption, especially where founding entities or community members may have vested interests in specific protocols.
Please review the below comments as I'm now convinced. The liquidity must be distributed to any and all Cardano defi protocols that meet reasonable and justifiable criteria; otherwise, the deployed liquidity can not be considered a "public good". This can be done fairly and proportionally if there is concern about liquidity fragmentation, but the proportionality must be fluid. As I'm sure the commitee is aware, additional TVL for DeFi protocols results in increased revenue, token value, and gives a competitive advantage. If there are 5 or 6 deFi protocols that meet minimum criteria, then we should not be choosing 2 or 3. That would be picking winners. The constitutional comittee must reject this proposal until these concerns are addressed.
I think stablecoin liquidity is good but I have some concerns about the protocol selection process.
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If we are providing liquidity to dexes why must there already be 250k USD worth of a stable on that particular dex? This seems like an arbitrary number chosen for what purpose I can only speculate. If you intend to deposit millions in liquidity, why does this matter?
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Why do the same dexes need to be selected every month? As I'm sure you are aware, Wave has investments in both Wingriders and Sundae Swap. Having IOG involved seems like a conflict of interest, because they will certainly direct treasury liquidity to their own investments. To be fair, I think all Cardano dexes should be involved, perhaps proportionally to ensure this commitee is not "picking winners".
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Dreps may have investments in specific dexes. Council members may have investments in specific protocols. Council members may purchase tokes in specific defi protocols before the announcement engaging in insider trading.
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In the spirit of decentralization this commitee should not be responsible for selecting which deFi protocols receive liquidity. There are clearly conflicts of interest and a perception of centralization.
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Any and all deFi protocols that meet reasonable criteria should receive public liquidity.
This is a pretty poor proposal for the stables suggested already have deepest liquidity and constantly depegging. Extremely poor use of funds when it should be targetted at acquiring users via incentivising defi protocols such as Indigo,Minswap instead of deepening liquidity. Or just get USDC from wanchain,supply it at minswap and bring on the interoperability with other chains
That’s a strategically vital idea for Cardano right now. could be a game-changer—especially as DeFi continues to mature on Cardano. Here's how it hits:
Why It’s Important:
Liquidity is lifeblood: Without deep liquidity, DEXs, lending protocols, and DAOs struggle to function. Stablecoins are central to that.
Boosts TVL & user confidence: Liquidity in stablecoins like DJED or USDA gives users a familiar unit of account and makes Cardano DeFi usable.
Reduces volatility risk: Projects can price services, tokens, and rewards in stablecoins—crucial for real-world adoption.
What a Treasury Budget Could Do:
Provide liquidity backing: The treasury could supply seed liquidity in ADA-stablecoin pairs (on Minswap, WingRiders, etc.).
Incentivize LPs: Set aside budget for yield farming or LP incentives to bootstrap pools with stablecoins.
Support stablecoin issuers: Fund audits, protocol development, or community education for trusted Cardano-native stablecoins.
Mitigate risk: Create an emergency reserve or insurance pool to protect against depegging events.
Risks & Considerations:
Which stablecoins? There’s DJED (overcollateralized), iUSD (synthetic), and upcoming USDA (regulated fiat-backed). Funding one over the other might be seen as favoritism.
Governance needed: A transparent, on-chain process to decide how much, to whom, and under what terms is essential.
Economic modeling: You’d need simulations or analysis to ensure ADA from the treasury is used effectively and sustainably.
Strategic Benefits:
Makes Cardano more competitive with Ethereum and Solana ecosystems.
Signals maturity and seriousness to outside investors and builders.
Empowers new dApps to launch without liquidity bottlenecks.
If you’re considering turning this into a Catalyst proposal, it could attract a lot of attention—especially if you show real data on liquidity gaps, stablecoin volumes, and DEX usage. Are you looking to champion this yourself or trying it.
I am very happy to see how far this proposal has come, especially since its first presentation on this forum. Many of my earlier concerns I shared in private with the proposer and in public on X have been resolved and addressed. I do, however, have two final points of feedback:
- A more holistic approach in terms of HOW the funding of this proposal will positively impact the community should both be shared AND, set as a target/goal of the proposal itself.
Liquidity itself is a single point of consideration to solve when it comes to the DeFi landscape. Liquidity without utilisation, however, is a big issue that I foresee that can come as a result of this proposal being funded without efficient management of the funds. Increasing both the volume of trading on each stablecoin via arbitrage occurring on Dexes (and other DeFi solutions) should be a targeted metric included either within the bounds of the proposal or, as an abstracted goal derived from the funding of this proposal - documented in a publicly accessible forum.
- Thoroughness and due diligence behind which non fiat-backed stablecoin protocols to utilise.
Already this week (time of writing is 11 April 2025), many concerns citing DJED's usability have come to surface. Such cases of "Oops, our error but not really" are not a calibre of service we should aim to propagate in Cardano's DeFi landscape. Indigo has proven themselves over time and, there are already upcoming protocols such as Obymare are coming to market with an open-sourced codebase. I highly recommend a clear set of guidelines or "grading system" to determine which non-fiat stablecoin protocols can be used is set by the management committee (ratified on-chai by a vote or not is up to the community). We cannot afford to continue a cycle of "based on trust", especially when it comes to the deployment of treasury funds in DeFi. This essentially extrapolates the review process DeFi protocols must undergo to receive liquidity to the initial step of determining which non-fiat stablecoin protocol can be used to deploy the treasury funds.
Keen to see the future discussions on this matter and the successful passing of this proposal!
Good to see the activity here on the proposal, looking forward to the next phase and the on-chain vote
I support this, but I think that the treasury wallet should deploy the stablecoin liquidity into p2p-DeFi as a protocol-wide, open source, neutral market maker.
They could use a simple market making strategy that will buy anytime the price dips below $1 and sell any liqudity above $1. This will be maximally capital efficient and will bootstrap p2p-defi as a bonus.
The objective is vague, there is no mention of KPI, and a ton of trust problems
But first, let’s define liquidity:
“The extent to which an asset can be bought and sold in the markets without significantly affecting its price”
We are using dexs and familiar the term “slippage” so liquidity can be translated as:
“The extent to which a coin can be traded in dexs without significantly slippage”
Liquidity is a vague abstract term. The practical real-world benefit of boosted liquidity is the reduction of slippage.
Here is the thing: Currently, you can trade ADA10,000 for USDM in Minswap with 0.2% slippage. It is already low. If your goal is to reduce it to 0.05%, that’s fine. I don’t think that’s worth 50M of ADA but at least we have a concrete goal to achieve.
Also, with the above definition in mind, the part of the fund that allocated to lending protocols will not improve liquidity, not directly. Somebody have borrow the fund and specifically put it in ADA/USDM liquidity pools. If they deposit it into ADA/SNEK pools, for example, the liquidity of stablecoins will not be improved. Keep that in mind.
Now here comes the most concerning aspect of this thing: corruption
I read other comments. They are concerned about the “who”. That’s because this program puts an uncomfortable amount of trust in the 7 committees. They select the protocols and pools. The selected ones will gain unfair advantage over others. This encourages rent seeking. Dapps will focus on lobbying in stead of innovating. Not a healthy market dynamics.
And then there is this: “The committee will select a new committee member…”
So when the committees are corrupted, you rely on them to select their replacements?
There is no voting of ADA holders or dreps. The committees have little incentive to listen to the community. They have every incentive to select their own cronies. Thus after disbursement of the 50M ADA, the most the community can do is non-binding social pressure. Also the fund is invested, not spent. It can stay for perpetuity. In the future, it might be a good idea to clawback some of this fund to the treasury. There should be a mechanism for that. Preferably an on-chain mechanism.
And this: “The stablecoin reserve will remain in the ownership of the Cardano Treasury”
I don’t see how this can be true. It will be in the custody of a separate multi-sig wallet. Can the treasury claw back the fund?
That’s all. At the top of my head. I may come back with more.
I love the proposal and I think it's fantastic. I agree with @cryptocrow that the "who" is important. I can't think of a better person than @blockjock to be one of the 7 members.
Update, read above proposal again as it has been updated by Eldermillenial and Marco to include all suggestions from the community. Thank you to everyone who has submitted comments.
I cant vote yes on the use of millions of dollars without the who. I need to know with agreements who is handling the funds and the associated terms. We cant be lazy about this stuff and have to do the legwork involved not just come up with ideas and purpose. This isn't the 2017 ICO season.
This is a very useful proposal to boost the Defi ecosystem however there is need for more detailed information for the sustainability of this effort after this 12 month period stated in the proposal. Inaddition, what are the plans to be put in place to avoid centralization risks and to ensure community's accessibility and oversight function.
Reading through these comments, it’s clear that a lot of people want to walk before they run. measuring the community’s temperature first with a simple yes/no poll about stablecoins in the treasury seems logical—both @the_felix and @tobiasilskov lean that way. if we get a strong “yes,” we can refine the many details that are now missing, like who’s in charge of selecting stablecoins and how exactly the roles and fees break down among the third parties. facts only, no fluff.
@prometheus_pool sees a fundamental question: do we really want to plug treasury funds into stablecoins if the protocols themselves aren’t yet fully composable with DeFi? maybe that’s just papering over design gaps when stablecoins could tap their own liquidity for big swaps. the underlying message is: fix the structural obstacles, then see what we really need from the treasury. that rings true. and Pyro’s support for elder_millenial underscores the trust he’s earned. but trust alone won’t solve the final-mile details. you want to retain it? wrap those details in clarity.
I say keep your eye on the big prize: stablecoins can help Cardano’s DeFi flourish, but forging a robust plan with accountability and explicit roles is the only way to do it without losing the community’s confidence. sure, we can assume oversight committees and managers have everything handled—but if the specifics stay vague, no serious voter will sign away the keys for 50M ADA. so, step one is a broad yes/no poll. from there, rally the best minds to hammer out a definitive blueprint. keep it simple, keep it transparent, and we all come out stronger. ay are we cooked? not if we do it right.
Really like the efforts from elder_millenial here.. ecosystem is used that the dude constantly pulls awesome stuff of high quality, anyway.. since i fully agree to get certain % of the treasury into stables, i dont think that it is the best timing to already discuss specifics on the matter, my recommendation would be to start with a simple info action as temperature check to only ask e.g "Should Cardano Treasury include Stablecoins" or something in that nature, see how community stands generally.. if yes, then we got a strong message and legitimasy to work on details and specifics.
While I am in favor of supplying stablecoin liquidity from the treasury (you definately convinced me on that score), I don't think this proposal is complete enough to qualify as a proper treasury expenditure proposal yet. I think this should be an info-action proposal because it is TOO VAGUE. This proposal does not define several key elements such what % of the 50M ADA will be minted into which stablecoins? (50% USDM, 50% USDA? 33% iUSD, 33% USDA, 33% USDM?) It also does not specify what market maker(s) is proposed to execute the liquidity provision. It also does not account for how much and how the oversight committee and the market maker will be compensated for their services. How much of this 50M proposed expenditure can we expect will actually end up as stablecoins in Cardano? Similarly, The proposal specifies "guidelines" and "legal agreements" that the market maker must follow, but it does not go into any detail about them. All of the above could be overlooked if the proposal specified WHO IS RESPONSBILE FOR MAKING THOSE DECISIONS. Unfortunately it does not. For actions like this the outcome often depends on the details, and we have no details to evaluate or an administrative team to whose competency we can vet. For all the good arguements and suggestions in this proposal, it doesn't explain itself throughly enough to win my vote as a formal treasury withdrawl motion. I would vote for it as an info action. WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT THE DETAIL ARE, OR WHO WILL MAKE THOSE DECISIONS.
Elder Millenial is a truly non partisan person perfect to write such a proposal. I have seen him work hard for over 2 years to provide liquidity in stablecoins. I dont trust many people with something like this but this man puts his money, and his time where his mouth is he has my vote! - Pyro
I appreciate the time it takes to put something like this together, it's a well written proposal, though my personal belief is that this type of solution is premature. Spending money from the treasury in this manner has the danger of papering over real underlying problems that need to be dealt with sooner rather than later. I would argue that many of the stablecoins in the ecosystem already have a decent amount of liquidity, the problem is that it is basically locked up. If minting/burning of stablecoins were composable with defi, then dex's and dex aggregators could backstop orders with the stablecoin protocol's pegging mechanism instead of moving the market outside the peg, not to mention users themselves could arbitrage with significantly less risk. It is the responsibility of the stablecoin protocol itself to maintain its peg, if we try to solve this issue outside of the protocol via inorganic injection of money, we risk propping up protocols that have critical deficiencies and delaying the solving of real underlying problems. I believe the first step should be upgrading our stablecoins to unlock their natural liquidity. If someone wanted to buy or sell $3,000,000 in djed right now, they could do so via the djed contract for a 1.5% fee, or they could try using a dex/dex aggregator and pay the equivalent of an 80% fee. The djed smart contract has 20-25x the liquidity for djed-ada as all the dex's combined, once we unlock this natural liquidity of stablecoins and make it easily available to defi I believe we'll have a better idea of whether a proposal like this makes sense. Unlocking this liquidity could also potentially make non-fiat backed stablecoins more stable than fiat backed ones, since fiat backed stable coins don't have the same natural liquidity ready to composably interact with defi which (as you mention) creates a possible time delay in arbitraging.
This is a very good start and the beauty is we have the entire community engaged to review and add commentary and or suggestions for refinement. Here it to the future of Cardano and its burgeoning defi ecosysytem
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