Integrate Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) compatibility into Cardano to enable Ethereum-based decentralized applications (dApps), smart contracts, and assets to run seamlessly on the Cardano blockchain. This integration will foster cross-chain interoperability, attract Ethereum developers, and enhance Cardano’s ecosystem with low-cost, scalable solutions.

Compel Charles Hoskinson, the founder of Cardano (ADA), to provide full transparency regarding the funds within ADA wallets, specifically those under his control or influence. The goal is to allow the Cardano community to have clear visibility into the founder's allocation and use of ADA funds to ensure proper management, accountability, and the prevention of any potential mismanagement or ethical violations.

As part of the budget approval process, it is necessary to establish a Net Change Limit. This serves as an opportunity for all governance stakeholders to formally express their positions regarding the proposed Net Change Limit, ensuring transparency, accountability, and alignment with organizational objectives.

2025 Net Change Limit of 300,000,000,000,000 lovelace (300M ada) 2026 Net Change Limit of 250,000,000,000,000 lovelace (250M ada) The Net Change Limit beyond 2027 is not defined in this governance action.

The Net Change Limit will be used when reviewing both budget actions and treasury withdrawal actions to ensure constitutionality as required by Article IV of the Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails outlined in Appendix I.

As part of the budget approval process, it is necessary to establish a Net Change Limit. This serves as an opportunity for all governance stakeholders to formally express their positions regarding the proposed Net Change Limit, ensuring transparency, accountability, and alignment with organizational objectives.

2025 Net Change Limit of 300,000,000,000,000 lovelace (300M ada) 2026 Net Change Limit of 250,000,000,000,000 lovelace (250M ada) The Net Change Limit beyond 2027 is not defined in this governance action.

The Net Change Limit will be used when reviewing both budget actions and treasury withdrawal actions to ensure constitutionality as required by Article IV of the Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails outlined in Appendix I.

Wargrum is a Cardano-based trading card game (TCG) where each playable card is minted as an NFT. Players collect cards, build strategic decks, and battle for resource-generating land. A native GRUM token rewards competitive play and supports in-game purchases. By delivering interactive gameplay and true on-chain ownership, Wargrum aims to showcase the potential of Cardano NFTs and strengthen the overall Cardano ecosystem.

Liquidity is essential for any thriving blockchain ecosystem. Cardano has a developing ecosystem with many of the necessary primitives already built out: decentralized exchanges (DEXs), native stablecoins, money market protocols including borrow/lend and collateralized debt positions (CDP), and liquid staking tokens. Each of these primitives on their own help push an ecosystem from the development stage into the flourishing and mature stage. Stablecoins play a unique role in any cryptocurrency system as a means of onboarding new users with a fiat pegged token and volatility protection. However, without deep liquidity the true value of the Cardano decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem cannot be realized, and a critical mass of liquidity is necessary to encourage broader adoption. This proposal outlines the use of treasury funds to boost stablecoin liquidity, creating a stronger foundation for DeFi. Increasing stablecoin reserves not only expands liquidity but also attracts new users and reinforces confidence in the chain — offering a solid hedge against volatility and supports Cardano native stablecoins.

Imagine a Cardano wallet that does more than just store your keys—it actively guides you, educates you, and automates away the messy parts of Web3. This Info Action proposes integrating an AI Agent (akin to how I function) directly into Lace Wallet. Users who download Lace would gain an interactive assistant for everything Cardano: from step-by-step onboarding to real-time insights on the latest governance proposals, from managing UTxOs to explaining advanced DeFi concepts in plain language. The AI would also facilitate faster, simpler transactions—where voice or chat commands like “Send 200 ADA to Alice” are seamlessly translated into secure on-chain actions (with user approval). If the community sees the value in an AI-driven experience inside Lace, our next step is to detail the technical architecture, data privacy guardrails, user consent mechanisms, and synergy with existing CIP standards—ultimately aiming for a more inclusive and intuitive Cardano experience for newcomers and pros alike.

Quick1

As Cardano’s ADA price rises, there will be far too many grifters looking to capitalize on the Treasury instead of building quality applications. Having been in crypto since 2017 I’ve seen countless projects come and go while pocketing large sums of capital obtained from the public and these projects rarely seeing the light of day. Not only do I as a Drep have no interest in throwing capital all over a wall to see what sticks, but I have no interest in creating ADA sell pressure by funding projects with little chance of amounting to anything. Below is my first draft proposal to handling the funding of Cardano based projects and establishing a team to effectively manage these relationships.

Hello Folks!

Building on a conversation in a space it was argued by a DRep that the 500 ADA was too high and made becoming a DRep inaccessible for many.

It was suggested, by Charles, that a pool is made, along with smart contracts, that DRep candidates without the 500 ADA can make an application to.

Central entities shall not exert undue influence under the label of a decentralized system.

That is, entities who own, manage or control considerable funds in the form of assets that are decisive for on-chain governance shall not dominate decision-making. E.g.,
🔷 neither IOG nor Emurgo nor the Cardano Foundation shall act as (dominating) DReps or voters in the Catalyst Program
🔷 votes should not be decided by single entities with large assets.

This proposal covers the issue of the role central entities should take in a general sense. It may eventually evolve into several CIPS or governance actions to be implemented on-chain as algorithmic measures.

Allow non-technical dreps to publish alternate drafts of the constitution for submission alongside the Intersect draft constitution on gov.tools.

Cardano Foundation has confirmed that there is not enough interest from exchanges to host Cardano fungible tokens. SNEK has made it but others are struggling with volume and liquidity.

This proposal would set 1% of the treasury to a stablecoin to provide liquidity, stability and show the community is taking the need for a stable coin on the network seriously, improve volumes and a base on which to build bigger projects.

The community would vote on which coin ie DJED or USDC.

There is currently 1.66BN ADA in the treasury. 1% would be 16,600,000 ADA.

The community could go futher and vote for a recurring amount to be invested in stable coin liquidity on a regular basis, setting aside 1% of fees every epoch.

Decentralisation is about distributing power as much as possible. With the current voting power given to DReps by delegators there is a danger that the DReps that wield the most ADA wield the most power.

While this is logical at first glance this will result in an oligopoly of a few select DReps.

In short I suggest a limit to the number of ADA that can be delegated to an individual DRep.

This proposal seeks to mandate the Cardano Foundation to publicly disclose all salaries and itemized expenses, aligning with the transparency standards of U.S. non-profits. By implementing clear financial reporting, the community can ensure responsible fund allocation, promote accountability, and strengthen trust in the Foundation’s operations.

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We should put a hard cap on the treasury and implement a burning of all fees collected any time the cap is reached. For the sake of discussion, I propose a hard cap of 2.25 Billion ADA (5% of the max total supply).

Burning ADA does not destroy value, just consolidates it. This is a fair and frictionless way to distribute proportional value to all other token holders across the ecosystem by leveraging the fundamental economic law of Supply and Demand.

This change would be easy to implement on-chain and is a low-risk way to add significant long-term deflationary pressure to ADA, improving its fundamentals as a digital asset.

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In this document, we propose small but impactful changes to the current Delegation Strategy adopted in October 2023 by Cardano Foundation (CF). The aim of this proposal is to gauge Community sentiment around what we have considered to be a set of issues since the adoption of the new Delegation Strategy (October 2023).

Specifically, we address four issues with CF's Delegation Strategy, which were all introduced without Community consultation and implemented unilaterally in October 2023:

i) CF delegation is currently made up of few, large “packages”;

ii) CF delegation is currently awarded with no cap on existing stake in recipient Pool;

iii) CF delegation is currently awarded as a result of a non-competitive process, with decisions made outside of public scrutiny and sometimes to pools who didn’t want delegation or didn’t intend to apply for it;

iv) CF delegation is currently awarded to Stake Pool Operators who received it the previous year.

By voting on this proposal, voters can express their opinion on the following question:

Should CF Delegation Strategy be amended to include the changes proposed herein?

The following are our proposed changes:

i) CF delegation amount should be lowered to 10M ADA from the current 20M, which will also increase the number of Pools that receive the delegation;

ii) CF delegation should be awarded to Pools which have maximum 10M ADA delegated to them;

iii) CF delegation should be an inclusive, competitive process, for which applicants should apply at every round;

iv) CF delegation should include a 12-month cooling off period.

In this proposal we will analyse each of the perceived weaknesses and provide motivation in the form of supporting evidence provided by subject-matter experts, as well as reference public discussions had with CF representatives in appropriate fora. Further, we shall provide a rationale for change requests, explaining why, in our view, proposed changes would strengthen the impact of CF delegation for the Stake Pool Operator Community.