This has significant risk of kick-back requests, "introducer fees" and similar types of middleman abuse.

While I support the inclusion of stablecoins in this proposal—as liquidity for stable assets is critical for the Cardano ecosystem—I remain opposed overall due to the lack of transparency in the CNT selection process.

Specifically, while the proposal outlines eligibility criteria (such as trading volume and liquidity thresholds), the final selection of CNT projects appears discretionary and not clearly defined. Without a transparent process for how these projects are chosen, it’s difficult to ensure fairness or that the broader ecosystem will benefit as intended.

If the proposal were limited to stablecoins only, I would be in favor. However, given the current ambiguity around CNT selection, I cannot support this version.

I hope the team can consider adding a clearer, community-driven selection process in future iterations.

To be clear: I fully acknowledge that market makers are not volunteers and that Flowdesk, as a professional liquidity provider, should reasonably expect to generate revenue. However, the current version of your proposal presents MMAAS terms that are too loosely defined. Given that most community members are not experts in liquidity provision or market making, proposals involving CEX listings and liquidity services must provide far more concrete and evaluable information.

The presence of high-quality liquidity providers is indeed crucial for Cardano Native Token (CNT) adoption and success on exchanges. However, since crypto liquidity provisioning still largely operates in a regulatory gray area, any treasury-funded effort must be backed by highly detailed, transparent, and measurable terms.

I hope you understand that this feedback is not meant to be personal but to help improve the proposal for the benefit of the broader Cardano community.

Thank you for taking the time to clarify a few points I may have initially overlooked while reading through the proposal quickly. However, I would like to emphasize that I did carefully review the key sections related to the MMAAS service, especially those necessary to properly evaluate its scope and effectiveness.

1. Regarding your statement that Flowdesk does not receive funds from Intersect:

• Your rationale outlines a $7,000 monthly retainer fee per project for MMAAS. In practice, this means the project pays Flowdesk for its services, funded via Intersect.
• Furthermore, we can reasonably expect that you will request token loans from projects for market-making operations, which could potentially generate additional alpha for Flowdesk.
• Given these realities, portraying this proposal as if it were a charitable act does not seem appropriate.
• Simply put, the MMAAS budget is ultimately a payment for market-making services. It is not unreasonable, but it should be communicated transparently as such.

2. On the listing fee estimates:

• While your clarification is appreciated, the listing fee calculations remain vague.
• For instance, when a project proceeds with a listing via this proposal, is it correct to assume that no additional costs will be borne by the project and that the budget proposed here fully covers the exchange listing?
• If not, what parts of the listing process are covered, and what is left to the responsibility of the project?

3. Regarding MMAAS eligibility conditions:

• I understand that market-making requirements may vary depending on the token's FDV, supply in circulation, and volatility.
• However, the $50k/day trading volume threshold you mention is far too general.
• Any MMAAS service should come with clear KPI definitions, including: /Spread (e.g., quoted bid-ask spread within a % of mid), /Depth (liquidity available at certain price levels), /Runtime (hours per day that liquidity is maintained),
• Without detailed KPIs like these, it becomes very difficult to evaluate whether the MMAAS service is actually delivering what it promises.

This is quite a ridiculous proposal.

How exactly is your team defining “listing fee”? – As far as industry standards go, CEXs typically charge for technical integration, marketing budgets, and security deposits when onboarding a project. – And to my knowledge, the listing fees you cited in your rationale for Tier 1 exchanges are simply not accurate. – Listing fees vary significantly depending on the project, and they are not a fixed price that any single market maker can unilaterally determine.

Before we proceed with further questions, please first provide the list of exchanges your team considers to be “Tier 1.”

Based on my experience in the crypto hedge fund, prime brokerage, and related markets, I can confidently say that while market makers may support projects in the listing process on certain exchanges, it is not typical for them to act as brokers. Market makers functioning as brokers is not a standard industry practice.

Please clearly specify whether the listing fee your team is proposing is meant to serve as a “broker fee” for introducing the CNT project to exchanges, or if it is intended to cover actual listing-related costs such as technical fees, marketing budgets, or security deposits required by CEXs.

Ultimately, as the project engages in discussions with exchanges, the outcome of any listing negotiation is heavily dependent on the quality of the project itself. No market maker can independently leverage or guarantee a listing for a specific project. If such a guarantee is being offered, it is likely a gray-area deal and not aligned with standard industry practices.

I must express serious concern that this proposal lacks specificity regarding the actual use of funds being requested and presents an overly vague promise of listing support, which is not commensurate with the amount being asked.

I appreciate this proposal as it could increase the number of exchanges where Cardano tokens can be listed. If the criteria for eligible tokens are made clearer, it would make it even easier for DReps to evaluate.

1. The proposal states that at least one of the three conditions must be satisfied, but in the case of stable coins, even if constraint 2 is satisfied, does that mean that constraint 3 must not be satisfied?

In that case, does the stable coin case mean that all conditions must be satisfied?

(If it is not clear in the proposal, I recommend writing this down 🙏)

"For market-making purposes, at least one of the following three conditions must be satisfied for a token to benefit from liquidity provision via Flowdesk MMAAS:

Condition 1: A minimum of $50k/day organic trading volume on each CEX.

Condition 2: The token is a stablecoin with a price peg to a target level (e.g., $1).

Condition 3: If the token is not yet listed on a CEX:"

2. Personally, I would recommend designating three stablecoin and CNT names at this time.

3. If stablecoins have a clear story about how they will benefit after listing, I think it might be a good idea to focus on just one stablecoin this time.

4. There are concerns about moral hazard if the Treasury were to donate the entire listing costs of a specific project. 4-1) The project could be asked to bear a certain amount of the cost. 4-2) How about the amount provided by the Treasury be repaid over a few years (loan type), or a portion of future profits be donated to the Treasury (investment type)?

4. Is there any outlook or strategy to ensure that tokens will be sustainably traded after being listed and receiving liquidity support(after 2026)? Would it be possible to tie such sustainability to stricter conditions on eligible projects? From my perspective, even if a token satisfies one of the following conditions, there’s no guarantee that it will maintain sustainable trading activity:

• Condition 1: A minimum of $50k/day organic volume on each CEX
• Condition 2: A stablecoin whose price is pegged to a target level (e.g. $1)
• Condition 3: If the token is not yet listed on a CEX, it should have had at least 100k ADA/day in volume over the past 2 months, and at least 7M ADA in on-chain liquidity

5. This may be a little difficult to explain, but it is a question of fairness. With the possibility of many CNTs aiming for listing in the future, how should we think about bearing the listing costs from the treasury this time? For example, after tokens A, B, and C that meet this condition are listed using the treasury listing fee, if tokens D, E, F, etc. that meet the same conditions and have similar potential value are released in the future, should we continue to bear the listing fee from the treasury? Or is bearing the listing fee this time considered a special measure? If it is considered a special measure only this time, why can A, B, and C have their listing fees covered by the treasury? (How should we answer if the projects of tokens D, E, and F ask us that question?)

Thank you very much for your response — I’d like to kindly confirm a few points 🙏

1. For reference, would it be possible for you to list any currently existing CNTs that satisfy each of the following conditions?

• Condition 1: A minimum of $50k/day organic volume on each CEX
• Condition 2: A stablecoin whose price is pegged to a target level (e.g. $1)
• Condition 3: If the token is not yet listed on a CEX, it should have had at least 100k ADA/day in volume over the past 2 months, and at least 7M ADA in on-chain liquidity

2. I've heard that Condition 2 may include only USDM or USDA, and not DJED. Is that understanding correct?

3. Regarding the three categories above, could you elaborate a bit more on how this proposal would benefit the Cardano ecosystem as a whole, rather than just individual projects?

3-1)

“We aim at helping CNT tokens to grow in their lifecycle. For Cardano to grow and attract liquidity from outside its ecosystem, stable coin tokens must first be listed on leading centralized exchanges (CEXs).” I think I can somewhat understand this point, but could you explain in a bit more concrete terms how this would specifically benefit the broader Cardano ecosystem?

3-2)

“Additionally, top Cardano projects that are already listed should expand to major exchanges to enhance their liquidity.” This part is a little harder to grasp. It may indeed be lucky for the individual project, but is it self-evident that such a listing would directly result in ecosystem-level benefits equivalent to, say, $1M? Or are there some assumptions or conditions behind that?

3-3)

“At the same time, smaller projects should get a fair chance at getting liquidity and opportunities should be created for tokens that have yet to be listed on CEXs.” This is even more difficult to understand. Fairness is certainly important, but how exactly does this fairness translate into tangible benefits for the Cardano ecosystem? Without applying further constraints, isn’t there a possibility that it may not necessarily lead to ecosystem-level value?

I think the proposal is good and aims to enhance the African community. It will help developer engagement and innovation support. I want to ask one question. How does your proposal plan to support or collaborate with initiatives that aim to improve ADA or stablecoin liquidity across the continent?

Also, regarding stable coin, condition 2 here is necessary but not sufficient:

• Condition 2: Be a stablecoin for which price has a peg to a target level (e.g. 1$)

Here is a list of inputs that we would look at:

1. The history of stable pegging
2. A choice of custody(ex)
3. Fiat back stable token
4. CEX listing or not and volume on CEX

I think the impact of this proposal on the Cardano ecosystem will depend heavily on which tokens are ultimately listed. On the other hand, I think that in this proposal, the tokens that are listed are based on a first-come, first-served basis among those who meet certain requirements. In my opinion, even considering that the expenditure is at the level of 1 million ADA, the consent of the DRep is necessary for which tokens are listed.